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Abstract
Consider a roll-call in a binary decision where the agents announce their vote one
after the other. If agent's probability for yes is given by a common parameter
0 ≤ γ ≤ 1, votes are independent, and the orderings of the agents are equiprob-
able, then the probabilities to cast the deciding vote equal the Shapley-Shubik
index. The same remains true iﬀ the underlying joint probability distribution is
that of exchangeable random Bernoulli variables.
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1. Introduction
Consider a committee of heterogeneous agents who jointly decide on the
acceptance of a proposal by voting either yes or no. How important is
each agent in the decision process? To that end, consider a roll-call where
all agents row up in a line and declare their vote one after the other. In each
ordering there is a unique agent whose declaration ﬁnalizes the decision, i.e.,
the outcome is ﬁxed independent of the votes of the later agents. Calling
such an agent pivotal we can ask for the probability of an agent to be
pivotal. If all orderings are equiprobable and all agents independently vote
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yes with a common probability 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1, then the vector of chances to
be pivotal coincides with the Shapley-Shubik index.1
As an example consider a committee of three agents, where agent 1
with the support of at least two of the other agents can bring through a
proposal while agents 2 and 3 cannot. Assume that there are always exactly
two agents voting yes and all three cases occur with equal probability. If
agents 1 and 2 vote yes, then agent 1 is pivotal in all three orderings where
agent 2 is prior and agent 2 is pivotal in the remaining three orderings.
Performing the analysis for the two other cases gives (2
3
, 1
6
, 1
6
) in the end,
which also coincides with the Shapley-Shubik index despite the fact that
the votes are not independent.
The aim of this note is to classify all probability distributions of the
votes such that the vector of chances to be pivotal in the roll-call model
with equiprobable orderings coincides with the Shapley-Shubik index. It
turns out that this class consists of the joint probability distributions of
exchangeable Bernoulli random variables. The very same is true if the
model is generalized to coalitional games and the Shapley value.
2. Preliminaries
We denote the ith component of a vector x ∈ Rn by xi and let χa(x) =
#{1 ≤ i ≤ n : xi = a} count the number of entries that equal a.
Now, consider a set N = {1, . . . , n} of n > 0 agents who may coop-
erate in a given project. The creation of value is typically modeled as a
coalitional game v : 2N → R mapping each coalition, i.e., each S ⊆ N
of cooperating agents, to a real number. As a normalization we assume
v(∅) = 0. How should the generated surplus v(N) of the grand coalition be
distributed among the agents? How important is each agent to the overall
cooperation? Values, i.e., operators mapping coalitional games to Rn, try
to answer these questions. However, those operators are far too general to
1The coincidence was mentioned in (Mann and Shapley, 1964, fn. 3) and proven in
Felsenthal and Machover (1996). See Shapley and Shubik (1954) for the original deﬁnition
of the Shapley-Shubik index.
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yield a reasonable solution so that additional properties may be required. A
value ψ is called linear if ψ(α ·u+β ·v) = α ·ψ(u)+β ·ψ(v) for all constants
α, β ∈ R and all coalitional games u, v on the same set N of agents, where
(α · u+ β · v) (S) = α · u(S) + β · v(S) for all S ⊆ N . Given a value ψ we
write ψi(v) for the payoﬀ for agent i ∈ N . With this, ψ is called eﬃcient
if
∑
i∈N ψi(v) = v(N). An agent i ∈ N satisfying v(S) = v(S ∪ {i}) for all
S ⊆ N is called a null (in v). If ψi(v) = 0 for any coalitional game v and
any null i in v, then ψ satisﬁes the null player property. Two agents i, j ∈ N
satisfying v(S ∪{i}) = v(S ∪{j}) for all S ⊆ N\{i, j} are called equivalent.
With this, ψ is called symmetric if ψi(v) = ψj(v) for any coalitional game
v and any two equivalent agents i, j ∈ N .
A well-known and commonly applied value is the Shapley value ϕ, see
Shapley (1953). By Sn we denote the set of all permutations of N and by
P pii the set of all agents preceding i in order pi ∈ Sn. With this, we have
ϕi(v) =
1
n!
·
∑
pi∈Sn
[v(P pii ∪ {i})− v(P pii )] (1)
for all i ∈ N , which may also be rewritten as
ϕi(v) =
∑
S⊆N\{i}
|S|! · (n− |S| − 1)!
n!
· [v(S ∪ {i})− v(S)] . (2)
In Shapley (1953) it was shown that the Shapley value is the unique value
that satisﬁes eﬃciency, linearity, symmetry and the null player property.
Besides this axiomatic characterization, Equation (1) allows a diﬀerent in-
terpretation within the roll-call model. Assume that all agents row up in a
line and declare their cooperation one after the other. Given the ordering
pi ∈ Sn, at the time when agent i declares his or her cooperation, the corre-
sponding marginal contribution amounts to v(P pii ∪ {i}) − v(P pii ). Consid-
ering all orderings to be equiprobable gives Equation (1), cf. the bargaining
model in Shapley (1953).
If an agent declares not to cooperate, then the formation of the grand
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coalition is blocked, which also reﬂects some kind of importance of an agent.
The corresponding marginal contribution may be measured as
v(N\P pii )− v(N\ (P pii ∪ {i})) = v∗(P pii ∪ {i})− v∗(P pii ) ,
where v∗(S) := v(N)− v(N\S) for all S ⊆ N deﬁnes the dual game. With
this, we consider a generalized model. Each agent i can either declare to
cooperate, modeled as di = 1, or not to cooperate, modeled as di = −1. An
instance R = (pi, d) in the roll-call model consists of an ordering pi ∈ Sn of
the agents and a vote d ∈ {−1, 1}n. By Y(R, i) we denote the set of agents
j ∈ N that precede agent i and said yes to a cooperation, i.e., dj = 1.
Similarly, N (R, i) denotes the set of agents j ∈ N that precede agent i
and said no to a cooperation, i.e., dj = −1. With this we can deﬁne the
marginal contribution as
M(v,R, i) =
{
v(Y(R, i) ∪ {i})− v(Y(R, i)) if di = 1,
v∗(N (R, i) ∪ {i})− v∗(N (R, i)) if di = −1.
(3)
Assuming some probability distribution p : {−1, 1}n → R, i.e., p(d) ≥ 0
for all d ∈ {−1, 1}n and ∑d∈{−1,1}n p(d) = 1, we can deﬁne a generalized
value by
ϕpi (v) =
1
n!
·
∑
pi∈Sn
∑
d∈{−1,1}n
p(d) ·M(v, (pi, d), i) (4)
for all agents i ∈ N . In words, we average over equiprobable orderings and
votes according to some given probability distribution.
In voting theory the subclass of simple games, i.e., im(v) = {0, 1} and
v(S) ≤ v(T ) for all ∅ ⊆ S ⊆ T ⊆ N , is a well-studied restriction of
coalitional games. Being part of a coalition here means voting yes on a
proposal. The group decision is to accept the proposal iﬀ v(S) = 1 for
the set S of supporters. An even narrower subclass of simple games are
unanimity games uT for ∅ 6= T ⊆ N deﬁned via v(S) = 1 iﬀ T ⊆ S. For a
simple game v we have M(v,R, i) ∈ {0, 1} and M(v,R, i) = 1 iﬀ agent i is
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pivotal in R.
3. Results
Proposition 1 For any probability distribution p the value ϕp is linear,
eﬃcient, and satisﬁes the null player property.
Proof The null player property is obvious from the deﬁnition. The same
is true for linearity since v∗(N (R, i)∪{i})− v∗(N (R, i)) = v(N\N (R, i))−
v(N\ (N (R, i) ∪ {i})). For eﬃciency we observe
n∑
i=1
M(v,R, i) = v(Y)− v(∅) + v∗(N )− v∗(∅) = v(N)− v(∅) = v(N),
where Y = {i ∈ N : di = 1} and N = {i ∈ N : di = −1}, for any
R ∈ Sn × {−1, 1}n due to the telescope sum behavior. The observations
|Sn| = n! and
∑
d∈{−1,1}n p(d) = 1 ﬁnish the proof. 
So, in order to make ϕp coincide with the Shapley value ϕ, just sym-
metry is missing, which can obviously be achieved by additionally re-
quiring p(d) = p(d′) for all d, d′ ∈ {−1, 1}n with χ1(d) = χ1(d′), where
χa(x) = #{1 ≤ i ≤ n : xi = a} for x ∈ Rn. In probability theory this
condition is known as exchangeability. In words, the probability p(d) just
depends on the number χ1(d) of yes votes in d. This goes in line with
de Finetti's theorem stating that exchangeable observations are condition-
ally independent relative to some latent variable.2 So, the Shapley value
is also the appropriate answer in a roll-call model with dependent agents
if the underlying random variables are exchangeable, see Hu (2006) for a
combinatorial proof.
Of course, it would be nice to know whether that is the end of the
road. And indeed, it is. Certainly, the comprehensive class of coalitional
2The coincidence result mentioned in Footnote 1 together with de Finetti's theorem
also directly implies ϕp = ϕ for all joint probability distributions p of exchangeable
random Bernoulli variables.
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games may cause severe restrictions on the set of admissible probability
distributions p, so that we consider the rather narrow class of unanimity
games here.
Proposition 2 Any probability measure p on {−1, 1}n that satisﬁes ϕp(uT ) =
ϕ(uT ) for all ∅ 6= T ⊆ N is the joint probability distribution of exchangeable
random Bernoulli variables.
For a proof we inductively infer a set of equations for the values of p,
which ﬁnally yield Proposition 2, see Section A in the appendix. As a direct
implication of our propositions we obtain:
Theorem 1 Let V be a subclass of coalitional games containing unanimity
games. We have ϕp(v) = ϕ(v) for all v ∈ V if and only if p is the joint
probability distribution of exchangeable random Bernoulli variables.
To close we reconsider the simple game v from the introduction.3 Now
assume that agent 1 always disagrees with agent 2 and that the feasible four
vote vectors are equiprobable. The changes of being pivotal in the roll-call
model, with equiprobable orderings, are given by (1
2
, 1
8
, 3
8
) 6= (2
3
, 1
6
, 1
6
).
3The voting procedure v can be represented by weights 2, 1, 1 and quota 3.
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Appendix
A. Proof of Proposition 2
In order to prove Proposition 2 we introduce further notation and refor-
mulate the statement so that it better ﬁts to an inductive proof. Given a
probability measure p on {−1, 1}n we write
p(x) =
∑
d∈{−1,1}n : di=xi∨xi=0∀i∈N
p(d)
for all x ∈ {−1, 0, 1}n, i.e., we sum the probabilities of all {−1, 1} vectors
that match the −1s and 1s in x, where a 0 in x is a wildcard. We set
χa(x) = #{1 ≤ i ≤ n : xi = a} for x ∈ Rn and write 1k, 0k for the vectors
of k ones and zeros, respectively.
Lemma 1 For any probability measure p on {−1, 1}n that satisﬁes ϕp(uT ) =
ϕ(uT ) for all ∅ 6= T ⊆ N we have p(x) = p(x′) for all x, x′ ∈ {−1, 0, 1}n
with χ−1(x) = χ−1(x′), χ1(x) = χ1(x′), and {i ∈ N : xi = 0} = {i ∈ N :
x′i = 0}.
Proof For any given positive integer n we prove the statement by induction
on m := χ−1(x) + χ1(x), where 0 ≤ m ≤ n. If χ1(x) = 0 or χ−1(x) = 0 we
have x = x′, which implies the statement. Thus, we can assume n ≥ m ≥ 2,
χ1(x) ≥ 1, and χ−1(x) ≥ 1 in the following.
For T = {i ∈ N : xi 6= 0} we consider the unanimity game uT . To ease
the notation we assume T = {1, 2, . . . ,m} 6= ∅ w.l.o.g. Let us ﬁrst compute
ϕph(uT ) for h ∈ T . If z ∈ {−1, 1}n−m and z ∈ {−1, 1}m with zh = −1, then
agent h is pivotal in exactly 1/χ−1(z) of the n! roll-calls (pi, (z, z)), since it
has to be the ﬁrst −1 among the agents in T . If zh = 1, then agent h is
pivotal in (pi, (z, z)) iﬀ pih ≥ pil and zl = 1 for all l ∈ T , since it has to be
the last among the agents in T . Thus, we compute
ϕph(uT ) =
1
m
· p(1m,0n−m) +
∑
z∈{−1,1}m : zh=−1
1
χ−1(z)
· p(z,0n−m).
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For any i, j ∈ T we have ϕpi (uT ) = ϕpj(uT ) since ϕi(uT ) = ϕj(uT ). To
ease the notation we assume i = 1, j = 2, for a moment. Inserting into
ϕp1(uT ) = ϕ
p
2(uT ) and canceling out equal summands gives∑
y∈Y
f(y) · p(−1, 1, y,0n−m) =
∑
y∈Y
f(y) · p(1,−1, y,0n−m),
where Y = {−1, 1}m−2 and f(y) = 1/ (1 + χ−1(y)).
For m = 2 this equation is equivalent to the statement of the lemma
so that we assume m ≥ 3 in the following. For a given y ∈ Y and an
index l with yl = −1 let y′ and y arise from y by replacing yl with 1 and 0,
respectively, so that the induction hypothesis gives
p(−1, 1, y,0n−m) + p(−1, 1, y′,0n−m) = p(−1, 1, y,0n−m)
= p(1,−1, y,0n−m) = p(1,−1, y,0n−m) + p(1,−1, y′,0n−m). 
Setting a(y) = p(−1, 1, y,0n−m) and b(y) = p(1,−1, y,0n−m) for all y ∈
Y we can apply Lemma 2 to deduce p(−1, 1, y,0n−m) = p(1,−1, y′,0n−m)
for all y, y′ ∈ Y with χ−1(y) = χ−1(y′).
Choosing i, j ∈ T arbitrarily, we have p(y,0n−m) = p(y′,0n−m) for all
y, y′ ∈ {−1, 1}m arising from each other by swapping a −1 and a 1. Thus,
by a sequence of swaps we can show p(y,0n−m) = p(y′,0n−m) for any y, y′ ∈
{−1, 1}m with χ1(y) = χ1(y′), which inductively proves the statement for
all m ≥ 2. 
Of course Lemma 1 implies Proposition 2 as the special case where
χ−1(x) + χ1(x) = n.
Lemma 2 Let a(z), b(z) ∈ R for all z ∈ {−1, 1}n with
∑
z∈{−1,1}n
a(z)
1 + χ−1(z)
=
∑
z∈{−1,1}n
b(z)
1 + χ−1(z)
and a(z) + a(z′) = b(z) + b(z′) for all z, z′ ∈ {−1, 1}n that diﬀer in exactly
one coordinate. Then, a(z) = b(z) for all z ∈ {−1, 1}n.
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Proof Let Z(i) ⊆ {−1, 1}n, z(i) ∈ Z(i), l ∈ {1, . . . , n} with z(i)l = −1,
and z¯(i) ∈ Z(i), where z¯(i)j = z(i)j for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n}\{l} and z¯(i)l =
−z(i)l = 1. If
∑
z∈Z(i) c
(i)(z)a(z) =
∑
z∈Z(i) c
(i)(z)b(z) for some c(i)(z) ∈
R, then subtracting c(i) · (a(z(i))+ a(z¯(i))) on the left hand side and c(i) ·(
b
(
z(i)
)
+ b
(
z¯(i)
))
on the right hand side yields∑
z∈Z(i−1)
c(i−1)(z)a(z) =
∑
z∈Z(i−1)
c(i−1)(z)b(z)
for Z(i−1) = Z(i)\{z(i)}, c(i−1)(z) = c(i)(z) for all z ∈ Z(i)\{z(i), z¯(i)}, and
c(i−1)
(
z¯(i)
)
= c(i)
(
z¯(i)
)− c(i)(z(i)).
Starting with Z(r) = {−1, 1}n and c(r)(z) = 1
1+χ−1(z)
for all z ∈ {−1, 1}n,
where r = 2n, and choosing z(i) ∈ Z(i) such that χ−1(z(i)) = max
{
χ−1(z) : z ∈ Z(i)
}
for all 2 ≤ i ≤ r yields Z(1) = {1n} and c(1)(1n)a(1n) = c(1)(1n)b(1n) with
c(1)(1n) =
∑
z∈{−1,1}n
(−1)χ−1(z)
1 + χ−1(z)
=
n∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
(−1)k
k + 1
=
1
n+ 1
,
where the last equation is due to Lemma 3. Thus, a(1n) = b(1n).
Now let z∗ ∈ {−1, 1}n\{1n} be arbitrary. Again, we start with Z(r) =
{−1, 1}n and c(r)(z) = 1
1+χ−1(z)
for all z ∈ {−1, 1}n. For each 3 ≤ i ≤ r we
choose z(i) ∈ Z(i)\{z∗} such that χ−1(z(i)) = max
{
χ−1(z) : z ∈ Z(i)\{z∗}
}
.
Moreover we choose l ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that z¯(i) 6= z∗. With this we end up
with Z(2) = {z∗,1n} and the equation
a(z∗)
1 + χ−1(z∗)
+ c(2)(1n)a(1n) =
b(z∗)
1 + χ−1(z∗)
+ c(2)(1n)b(1n).
Thus a(z∗) = b(z∗) since 1
1+χ−1(z∗)
6= 0 and a(1n) = b(1n). 
Lemma 3 For all n ∈ N>0 we have
n∑
k=0
(
n
k
) · (−1)k
k+1
= 1
n+1
.
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Proof
n∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
· (−1)
k
k + 1
=
n∑
k=0
(
n+ 1
k + 1
)
· (−1)
k
n+ 1
=
1
n+ 1
·
n+1∑
k=1
(
n+ 1
k
)
· (−1)k−1
=
1
n+ 1
·
(
1−
n+1∑
k=0
(
n+ 1
k
)
· (−1)k
)
=
1
n+ 1
· (1− (1− 1)n+1) = 1
n+ 1

B. Alternative proof
Lemma 4 For all n ∈ N>0 we have
(a)
∑n
k=0
(
n
k
) · (−1)k = 0;
(b)
n∑
k=0
(
n
k
) · (−1)k
k+1
= 1
n+1
;
(c)
n∑
k=0
(
n
k
) · (−1)k
k+1+x
= n!∏n
k=0(1+x+k)
for all x ∈ R>−1;
(d)
n∑
k=0
(
n
k
) · (−1)k
k+x
= n!∏n
k=0(x+k)
for all x ∈ R>0.
For n = 0 the ﬁrst sum is equal to 1. The three other formulas are also
valid for n = 0.
Proof For part (a) the Binomial theorem gives 0 = (1 − 1)n = ∑nk=0 (nk) ·
(−1)k. Note that n ≥ 1 is necessary since ∑0k=0 (0k) · (−1)k = (00) = 1.
For part (c) we consider the polynomial
f(x) =
n∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
· (−1)k ·
∏
0≤j≤n : j 6=k
(x+ 1 + j)
of degree at most n. For every integer 0 ≤ i ≤ n we have
f(−i−1) =
(
n
i
)
·(−1)i·
∏
0≤j≤n : j 6=i
(x+1+j) =
(
n
i
)
·(−1)i·(−1)ii!·(n−i)! = n!.
Thus f(x) = n! and part (c) follows via division by
∏n
k=0(1+x+k). Setting
x = 0 we obtain part (b). Part (d) follows from (c) by a simple variable
transformation. 
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Lemma 5 For a non-negative integer n let M be the 2n×2n matrix deﬁned
by MT,S =
1
1+|T\S| for all S, T ⊆ {1, . . . , n}. The inverse matrix is given by
M−1T,S =
(
n+1
n+|T\S|
) · (−1)|S∆T |.
Proof Since (M ·M−1)T,S =
∑
U∈{1,...,n}MT,U ·M−1U,S, we have(
M ·M−1)
T,S
=
∑
U⊆S
n+ 1
1 + |T\U | · (−1)
|S\U | +
∑
U⊆N : |U\S|=1
−1
1 + |T\U | · (−1)
|S\U |
=
∑
U⊆S
n+ 1
1 + |T\U | · (−1)
|S\U | +
∑
U⊆S
∑
l∈N\S
−1
1 + |T\(U ∪ {l})| · (−1)
|S\U |
Let us use the abbreviations a = |T ∩S| and b = |S\T |, so that a+ b = |S|.
With this we compute∑
U⊆S
n+ 1
1 + |T\U | · (−1)
|S\U |
=
a∑
i=0
b∑
j=0
(
a
i
)(
b
j
)
· n+ 1
1 + |T | − i · (−1)
|S|−i−j
=
a∑
i=0
(
a
i
)
· n+ 1
1 + |T | − i · (−1)
|S|−i ·
(
b∑
j=0
(
b
j
)
· (−1)j
)
and ∑
U⊆S
∑
l∈N\S
−1
1 + |T\(U ∪ {l})| · (−1)
|S\U |
=
∑
l∈N\S
a∑
i=0
b∑
j=0
(
a
i
)(
b
j
)
· −1
1 + |T\{l}| − i · (−1)
|S|−i−j
= −
∑
l∈N\S
a∑
i=0
(
a
i
)
· 1
1 + |T\{l}| − i · (−1)
|S|−i ·
(
b∑
j=0
(
b
j
)
· (−1)j
)
,
so that (M ·M−1)T,S = 0 if b > 0 due to Lemma 4.(a). Thus, we assume
b = 0, i.e., S ⊆ T in the following and use the abbreviation x = |T\S|.
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With this we have |N\S ∩ T | = |T\S| = x, |N\(S ∪ T )| = n− |S| − x, and(
M ·M−1)
T,S
=
|S|∑
i=0
(|S|
i
)
· (n+ 1) · (−1)
|S|−i
1 + x+ |S| − i −
|S|∑
i=0
(|S|
i
)
· (n− |S| − x) · (−1)
|S|−i
1 + x+ |S| − i
−
|S|∑
i=0
(|S|
i
)
· x · (−1)
|S|−i
x+ |S| − i
=
|S|∑
i=0
(|S|
i
)
· (|S|+ x+ 1) · (−1)
|S|−i
1 + x+ |S| − i −
|S|∑
i=0
(|S|
i
)
· x · (−1)
|S|−i
x+ |S| − i
= (|S|+ x+ 1) ·
|S|∑
i=0
(|S|
i
) · (−1)i
1 + x+ i
− x ·
|S|∑
i=0
(|S|
i
) · (−1)i
x+ i
. 
For x = 0, i.e., S = T , Lemma 4.(b) then gives (M ·M−1)T,T = 1. For
x > 0, i.e., S ( T , parts (c) and (d) of Lemma 4 give
(
M ·M−1)
T,S
= (|S|+ x+ 1) · n!∏|S|
k=0(1 + x+ k)
− x · n!∏|S|
k=0(x+ k)
= 0.
As an example we have
M2 =

1 1 1 1
1
2
1 1
2
1
1
2
1
2
1 1
1
3
1
2
1
2
1

with
M−12 =

3 −3 −3 3
−1 3 1 −3
−1 1 3 −3
0 −1 −1 3
 .
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For n = 3 we have
M3 =

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1
2
1 1
2
1
2
1 1 1
2
1
1
2
1
2
1 1
2
1 1
2
1 1
1
2
1
2
1
2
1 1
2
1 1 1
1
3
1
2
1
2
1
3
1 1
2
1
2
1
1
3
1
2
1
3
1
2
1
2
1 1
2
1
1
3
1
3
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1 1
1
4
1
3
1
3
1
3
1
2
1
2
1
2
1

with
M−13 =

4 −4 −4 −4 4 4 4 −4
−1 4 1 1 −4 −4 −1 4
−1 1 4 1 −4 −1 −4 4
−1 1 1 4 −1 −4 −4 4
0 −1 −1 0 4 1 1 −4
0 −1 0 −1 1 4 1 −4
0 0 −1 −1 1 1 4 −4
0 0 0 0 −1 −1 −1 4

.
Lemma 6 Let N = {1, . . . , n}. For any probability measure p on {M ⊆ N}
that satisﬁes ϕp(uT ) = ϕ(uT ) for all ∅ 6= T ⊆ N we have p(D) = p(D′) for
all 0 ⊆ D,D′ ⊆ N with |D| = |D′|.
Proof If |D| = 0 or |D¯| = 0 we have D = D′, which implies the statement.
Thus, we can assume n ≥ 2, |D| ≥ 1, and |D¯| ≥ 1 in the following.
For T ⊆ N we consider the unanimity game uT . Let us ﬁrst compute
ϕph(uT ) for h ∈ T . If h /∈ S, then agent h is pivotal in exactly 1/|T\S| of
the n! roll-calls (pi, S), since it has to be the ﬁrst decliner among the agents
in T . If h ∈ S, then agent h is pivotal in (pi, S) iﬀ pih ≥ pil and l ∈ S for all
l ∈ T , since it has to be the last among the agents in T . Thus, we compute
ϕph(uT ) =
∑
T⊆S⊆N
1
|T | · p(S) +
∑
∅⊆S⊆N\{h}
1
|T\S| · p(S).
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Let i and j be two diﬀerent agents in N . For h ∈ {i, j} and {i, j} ⊆
T ⊆ N we have
ϕph(uT ) =
∑
T⊆S⊆N
1
|T | · p(S) +
∑
∅⊆S⊆N\{i,j}
1
|T\S| · p(S)
+
∑
∅⊆S⊆N\{i,j}
1
|T\S| − 1 · p(S ∪ {i, j}\{h}). (5)
For a given ∅ ⊆ X ⊆ N\{i, j} we set
vX =
∑
{i,j}⊆T⊆N
λT,X · uT ,
where λT,X = M
−1
T\{i,j},X using the notation from Lemma 5. Thus,
∑
{i,j}⊆T⊆N
λT · 1|T\S| − 1 =
{
0 : S 6= X
1 : S = X
(6)
for any ∅ ⊆ S ⊆ N\{i, j}.
By construction we have ϕi(vX) = ϕj(vX) and ϕ
p
i (vX) = ϕ
p
j(vX), so that∑
{i,j}⊆T⊆N
λT,X · ϕpi (uT )
∑
{i,j}⊆T⊆N
λT,X · ϕpj(uT ).
Now we cancel out equal summands on both sides. Due to Equation (5) for
each T only the last sum multiplied by λT,X remains. Equation (6) further
reduces this to p(X ∪ {j}) = p(X ∪ {i}).
We get from set X ∪ {i} to X ∪ {j} by replacing agent i by agent j.
Thus, by a sequence of such replacements we can show p(D) = p(D′) for
any ∅ ⊆ D,D′ ⊆ N with |D| = |D′|. 
Of course Lemma 6 implies Proposition 2.
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